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ABSTRACT: This paper uses the language of formal dialectics to explore how argumentation schemes and
their critical questions can be characterized as an extension to traditional dialectical systems. The aim is to
construct a dialectical system in which (i) the set of locutions is extended to include scheme-based moves
(ii) the set of structural rules describes the roles that critical questioning can play; and (iii) the set of
commitment rules distinguishes between exceptions and assumptions.
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INTRODUCTION
Argumentation schemes have been proving to be a powerful tool in understanding the
structure of arguments as well as playing a key role in the pedagogy of critical thinking.
One of the key features of schemes is the set of critical questions. Walton and others have
started to explicate how these critical questions seem to be of two types: assumptions and
exceptions. The way in which these two function in argumentative discourse is now just
starting to be better understood, and a link with burden of proof is being established,
particularly in the context of legal argumentation. The inherently dialogical nature of
critical questions has to date, however, been rather down-played. This paper uses the
language of formal dialectics to explore how argumentation schemes and their critical
questions can be characterized as an extension to traditional dialectical systems. The aim
is to construct a dialectical system in which (i) the set of locutions is extended to include
supporting claims with arguments constructed from schemes, and responding to
challenges by countering with such arguments; (ii) the set of structural rules describes the
roles that critical questioning can play; and (iii) the set of commitment rules distinguishes
between exceptions and assumptions. In this way the formal dialectic specification itself
captures the way in which the different schemes license both proponent and opponent to
use particular moves, and the different critical questions oblige and permit particular
dialogical actions.

Reed, C. & Walton, D. (2007). Argumentation schemes in dialogue. In H.V. Hansen, et. al. (Eds.),
Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground, CD-ROM (pp. 1-11). Windsor, ON: OSSA.
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ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES
Argumentation schemes are forms of inference from premises to a conclusion of the kind
used in arguments used in everyday conversational exchanges in which one party is
trying to get another to come to accept a conclusion that is at issue. They represent
patterns of deductive and inductive reasoning in some instances, but typically they
represent defeasible inferences of a kind that are useful heuristics for moving to a
plausible hypothesis under conditions of uncertainty and lack of knowledge. Many of
them are similar to the so-called topics of Aristotle, and, in the same way as topics were
long taken to be, can be useful for inventing arguments as well as for evaluating them. In
modern times, many of the most common and important schemes have been identified
and analyzed by Hastings (1963), Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), Kienpointner
(1992), Walton (1996), and Grennan (1997). Recently there has been considerable
interest in schemes in computer science, notably in artificial intelligence, where they are
increasingly being recognized in fields like multi-agent systems as useful for making
refining the reasoning capabilities of artificial agents (Reed and Norman, 2003; Verheij,
2003). For special use in artificial intelligence systems Pollock’s OSCAR (1995)
identified some ten schemes.
Schemes are necessary for identifying arguments, finding missing premises,
analyzing arguments, and finally for evaluating them. The tool used for evaluation is the
set of appropriate critical questions matching each scheme (Hastings, 1964). The
questions criticisms that, if not answered adequately, make the argument fitting the
scheme fail to hold. The scheme most commonly used to illustrate how schemes work is
the one for argument from expert opinion, as formulated in (Walton 1997, p. 210), here
with some minor notational changes. 1 E is an autonomous agent of a kind that can
possess knowledge in some field or domain expertise, represented by the variable F. Such
a domain of knowledge is assumed to contain a set of propositions (statements).
Scheme for Argument from Expert Opinion
Major Premise: Source E is an expert in field F containing proposition A.
Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A (in field F) is true (false).
Conclusion: A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).
Any argument fitting the scheme for argument from expert opinion is supposed to be
evaluated in a dialogue framework in which another party (usually called the respondent)
can ask critical questions. The standard six basic critical questions matching the appeal to
expert opinion (Walton 1997, p. 223) are these.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

1

Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert source?
Field Question: Is E an expert in the field F that A is in?
Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A?
Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as a source?
Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
Backup Evidence Question: Is E’s assertion based on evidence?

An earlier version used the variable D to represent the domain of knowledge.
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If the respondent asks one of the six critical questions a burden of proof shifts back to the
proponent’s side to respond appropriately. Asking any one of the six questions defeats the
argument temporarily until it has been answered.
The method of evaluating an argument like one from expert opinion is dialectical.
It is carried out by an assessment of such a shifting of burden of proof as a dialogue
proceeds in a given case (Walton 1997). When the respondent poses any one of the six
critical questions, the proponent has the burden of responding at the next move. The
problem of evaluating the argument this reduces to the problem of tracking such a
dialogue and deciding who has lost or won, given the moves they made, in the order they
made them. However, there are differences between the critical questions on how
strongly or weakly they produce such a shift.
Critical Questions in Carneades
Carneades approaches the problem of determining how the burden of proof should be
distributed by dividing premises of a scheme into three types, ordinary premises,
assumptions and exceptions (Gordon, Prakken and Walton, 2007). Evidence for ordinary
premises and assumptions must be produced by the proponent of the argument with these
premises, whereas evidence for exceptions must be produced by the respondent. The
critical questions matching the scheme are represented in Carneades as assumptions and
exceptions. The premises and conclusion of the scheme for argument from expert opinion
are classified in the Carneades model as follows.
Ordinary Premise: E is an expert in the subject domain S containing the
proposition A.
Ordinary Premise: E asserts A.
Assumption: E is a credible expert.
Exception: E is not reliable.
Exception: A is not consistent with the testimony of other experts.
Assumption: A is based on evidence.
Conclusion: A.
The distinction between assumptions and exceptions in Carneades tells us which answer
to a critical question can be assumed, if the critical question has not been asked yet.
Whether an assumption or exception is appropriate depends on the burden of proof in a
dialogue. If the respondent who poses the question should have the burden of proof, the
critical question should be classified as an exception. If the proponent should have the
burden of proof, the critical question should be classified as an assumption.
THE GAME ASD
Our aim is to define an Argumentation Scheme Dialogue, or ASD. We take as our
starting point Walton's (1984) game, CB. As a subset of Mackenzie's (1979) DC game
and Hamblin's (1970) H, it is both familiar and simple. CB has just four locutions, five
commitment rules and three further dialogue rules, and with such a small set, allows us to
explore what is unique to dialogue with schemes. (We hope in future to apply schemebased extensions to much richer accounts of argumentative dialogue such as PPD
(Walton and Krabbe 1995)). We do not here want to defend CB as a model of (even
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idealised) dialogue – but rather use it as a tool to explore how a dialogue game can be
extended to encompass argumentation schemes.
Walton's CB is as defined as follows (Walton 1984, pp133-135):
Locution Rules
i. Statements: Statement letters, S, T, U, ..., are permissible locutions, and truthfunctional compounds of statement-letters.
ii. Withdrawals: 'No commitment S' is the locution or withdrawal (retraction) of a
statement.
iii. Questions: The question 'S?' asks 'Is it the case that S is true?'
iv. Challenges: The challenge 'Why S?' requests some statement that can serve as a
basis in (a possibly defeasible) proof for S.
Commitment Rules
i. After a player makes a statement, S, it is included in his commitment-store.
ii. After the withdrawal of S, the statement S is deleted from the speaker's
commitment store.
iii. 'Why S?' places S in the hearer's commitment-store unless it is already there or
unless the hearer immediately retracts his commitment to S.
iv. Every statement that is shown by the speaker to be an immediate consequence of
statements that are commitments of the hearer then becomes a commitment of the
hearer's and is included in his commitment store.
v. No commitment may be withdrawn by the hearer that is shown by the speaker to
be an immediate consequence of statements that are previous commitments of the
hearer.
Dialogue Rules
R1. Each speaker takes his turn to move by advancing once locution at each turn. A
no-commitment locution, however, may accompany a why-locution as one turn.
R2. A question 'S?' must be followed by (i) a statement 'S', (ii) a statement 'Not-S', or
(iii) 'No commitment S').
R3. 'Why S?' must be followed by (i) 'No commitment S' or (ii) some statement 'T',
where S is a consequence of T.
Walton goes on to describe further Strategic Rules that are not of interest here and are
invariant to the extensions for argumentation schemes.
Like Mackenzie, Walton requires his dialogue game to have available to it a set of
rules of inference. In (Walton 1984), the assumption is that these are selected from the
rules of inference of propositional logic, but here we relax that assumption and instead
expand the set of rules to include argumentation schemes. Walton's (1984) definitions of
immediate consequence and consequence hold for schemes just as they do for deductive
rules of inference:
immediate consequence. A statement T is an immediate
consequence of a set of statements S0, S1, ... Sn if and only if 'S0,
S1, ..., Sn therefore T' is a substitution-instance of some rule of
the game.
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consequence. A statement T is a consequence of a set of
statements S0, S1, ... Sn if and only if T is derived by a finite
number of immediate consequence steps from immediate
consequences of S0, S1, ... Sn.
(Walton 1984, pp. 132-3)
The analogy between deductive and inductive reasoning is strong here: where deductively
if we know A and A e B, then B is an immediate consequence (assuming Modus Ponens
is amongst the rules of inference we accept); where inductively if we know E is an expert
(in the domain of X) and E asserts X, then X is an immediate consequence (assuming
Argument from Expert Opinion is amongst the rules of inference we accept).
CB supports what we might call 'reasoning elicitation' (i.e. the support of a
conclusion by a premise) along a single specific path: one player states S, the other player
challenges, Why S?, and the original player can respond with T, of which S is a
consequence. It is this reasoning elicitation step that is the focus of the extension of CB to
form ASD.
We introduce a new dialogue rule that is applicable after the S - Why S? - T
pattern:
(R4) After a statement T has been offered in response to a challenge locution,
Why S?, then if (S, T) is a substitution instance A of some argumentation scheme
of the game, the locution pose(C) is a legal move, where C is a critical question of
scheme A appropriately instantiated.
There are several things to note about rule R4. Firstly, CB does not deal explicitly with
enthymemes. It is not particularly instructive to extend it to do so, but it is important to
note that argumentation schemes have an arbitrary number of premises, and only some of
these premises might be introduced explicitly in a dialogue. So (S, T) in rule R4 may be a
partial substitution instance. We may, for example, say:
My doctor has said I need to eat less salt, so I probably should try and cut down.
This is an enthymeme in which the doctor's expertise in dietary matters is left implicit –
we have one of the premises of the scheme, plus its conclusion:
(Minor premise)
(Major premise)
(Conclusion)

My doctor has said I should eat less salt
My doctor is an expert on my diet
I should eat less salt

The instantiation (My doctor has said I should eat less salt, I should eat less salt) thus
counts as a partial substitution instance of the general form of the scheme, (E says A, E is
an Expert, A), and would license a pose(C) moves under rule R4.
The rule R4 introduces a new locution move, pose(C), which can be added as a
fifth in the list of CB's locutions:
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(v) Critical Attacks: the attack 'Pose C' poses the critical question C associated
with an argumentation scheme.
Though there is a single locution type, it has two distinct effects on the dialogue
depending on whether the critical question being posed is an exception or a assumption.
Broadly, we want to capture the intuition that assumptions are required for an argument
to go through, that they function much like missing or implied premises, and that
questioning them requires the proponent of the argument to justify. Exceptions, in
contrast, are potential attacks in which the barrier is set higher: an interlocutor must not
just ask the question but must provide some evidence for the potential counter. This
distinction is discussed with legal examples in (Prakken et al., 2005) and with
computational ramifications in (Gordon and Walton, 2006). We assume that the different
types of critical questions are explicitly marked - both (Gordon and Walton 2006) and
(Rahwan et al., 2007) suggest that this is a reasonable expectation in computational
practice as well as in theory. We can then formulate a new dialogue rule to handle the
Pose move:
(R5) After a 'Pose C' move, then either
(a) if C is an assumption of its argumentation scheme, the move is followed by
(i)
a statement 'C'
(ii)
a statement 'not-C'
(iii) 'No commitment C'
(b) if C is an exception to its argumentation scheme,
(i)
a statement 'C'
(ii)
a statement 'not-C'
(iii) 'No commitment C'
(iv)
'Why not-C?'
Part (a) of rule R5 is of course a rehearsal of the rule for the question move: questioning
an assumption is analogous (as Gordon and Walton (2006) and Verheij (2005) have
discussed) to questioning an implicit premise (in these earlier versions of the theory, what
are now called assumptions were referred to as presumptions). Part (b) extends the
permitted responses to include a reciprocal challenge move, requiring the other party to
justify their critical questioning.
So for example, an assumption of the expert opinion scheme is that E is indeed an
expert in the right field (an assumption associated with the second critical question of that
scheme). If this is questioned, the speaker must state that it is the case, or that it is not, or
withdraw commitment to it. Similarly the fourth critical question of the expert opinion
scheme allows a critic to probe the expert's reliability. The question that can be posed is
'Is the expert reliable?', to which the proponent can respond with not only statement or
withdrawal moves but also a challenge, 'Why is the expert not reliable?'
But what happens if critical questions are not posed? Clearly, with respect to
exceptions, there is nothing to do: only if an interlocutor takes exception is there any
work to be done – exceptions function as potential “growth points” of an argument, but
the opportunity for growth lapses if not taken up. But for assumptions, it seems natural to
account for the assuming some how. This is an ideal candidate for the notion of mere
concession introduced in Walton and Krabbe's (1995) PPD. Mere concessions provide a
way of accounting for propositions that are agreed to (typically by a hearer) but in a
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weaker way than commitments. Specifically, commitments are usually required to be
defended on demand, whilst mere concessions are not. Unfortunately, CB does not have
such a subcategory of commitment – so instead we sketch how bare commitment to
assumptions can be introduced.
(iv) Every statement that is shown by the speaker to be an immediate consequence
of statements that are commitments of the hearer via some rule of inference or
argumentation scheme A, then becomes a commitment of the hearer's, along with
all the assumptions of A.
This encompasses the previous version of this commitment rule because the definition
encompasses rules of inference such as Modus Ponens which have no assumptions, as
well as argumentation schemes which may have critical questions, some of which will be
marked as assumptions.
The new Pose move also introduces commitment directly but it does so in exactly
the same way as the challenge move, so can be accommodated by a change to CB's third
commitment rule:
(iii) Both 'Why S?' and 'Pose S' place S in the hearer's commitment store unless it
is already there or unless the hearer immediately retracts his commitment to S.
In combination, these changes to the rules of commitment and the rules of dialogue
ensure that inference over argumentation schemes can contribute to a dialogue in just the
same way as inference over deductive rules, and furthermore that the burden of proof is
distributed appropriately across the different critical questions: the proponent takes the
burden of proof for assumptions, the questioner for exceptions.
To summarise, our new dialectical game, ASD, is as follows:
Locution Rules
i. Statements: Statement letters, S, T, U, ..., are permissible locutions, and truthfunctional compounds of statement-letters.
ii. Withdrawals: 'No commitment S' is the locution or withdrawal (retraction) of a
statement.
iii. Questions: The question 'S?' asks 'Is it the case that S is true?'
iv. Challenges: The challenge 'Why S?' requests some statement that can serve as a
basis in (a possibly defeasible) proof for S.
v. Critical Attacks: the attack 'Pose C' poses the critical question C associated with
an argumentation scheme.
Commitment Rules
i. After a player makes a statement, S, it is included in his commitment-store.
ii. After the withdrawal of S, the statement S is deleted from the speaker's
commitment store.
iii. 'Why S?' places S in the hearer's commitment-store unless it is already there or
unless the hearer immediately retracts his commitment to S.
iv. Every statement that is shown by the speaker to be an immediate consequence of
statements that are commitments of the hearer via some rule of inference or
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argumentation scheme A, then becomes a commitment of the hearer's and is
included in his commitment store along with all the assumptions of A.
v. No commitment may be withdrawn by the hearer that is shown by the speaker to
be an immediate consequence of statements that are previous commitments of the
hearer.
Dialogue Rules
R1. Each speaker takes his turn to move by advancing once locution at each turn. A
no-commitment locution, however, may accompany a why-locution as one turn.
R2. A question 'S?' must be followed by (i) a statement 'S', (ii) a statement 'Not-S', or
(iii) 'No commitment S').
R3. 'Why S?' must be followed by (i) 'No commitment S' or (ii) some statement 'T',
where S is a consequence of T.
R4. After a statement T has been offered in response to a challenge locution, Why S?,
then if (S, T) is a substitution instance A of some argumentation scheme of the
game, the locution pose(C) is a legal move, where C is a critical question of
scheme A appropriately instantiated.
R5. After a 'Pose C' move, then either
(a) if C is a assumption of its argumentation scheme, the move is followed by
(i)
a statement 'C'
(ii)
a statement 'not-C'
(iii) 'No commitment C'
(b) if C is an exception to its argumentation scheme,
(i)
a statement 'C'
(ii)
a statement 'not-C'
(iii) 'No commitment C'
(iv)
'Why not-C?'
WORKED EXAMPLE
As an example, let us take the following dialogue fragment between Bob and Wilma.
Wilma isn’t sure about Bob’s assertion that the conference programme is perfect, and
tries to convince Bob that it has a mistake in it.
(L1) Bob: OSSA’s great; all the experts go. And they’re brilliant at doing the
programme – they never make a mistake.
(L2) Wilma: Hmm. Look at the programme: either Alf is staying at home, or
they’ve made a mistake on this one.
(L3) Bob: Yes, I suppose so.
(L4) Wilma: Well do you remember that ‘expert’ piece that Alf wrote in South
Western Ontario Philosophy Monthly that said that most Canadian philosophers
go to OSSA?
(L5) Bob: Yes, I remember.
(L6) Wilma: Well Alf should know, so we can take it that most Canadian
philosopher's do indeed go.
(L7) Bob: Yes but he'd have a biased opinion.
(L8) Wilma: Why do you think he's biased?
(L9) Bob: Er, not sure – OK so what if he wasn't biased? So what?
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(L10) Wilma: Well if we know that Canadian philosophers are going, then, given
that Alf is a Canadian philosopher, he'll certainly be going.
(L11) Bob: No, not necessarily – he only said most philosophers.
(L12) Wilma: Well, you must agree that if all experts are going (as you said) and
Alf is an expert (as you agreed), then Alf must be going any way.
(L13) Bob: Yes, I suppose so.
We can reconstruct the dialogue propositionally, tracking the changes to the commitment
stores thus:
Locution

Speaker

Content

L1

B

a, b

L2

W

c w not-a ?

L3

B

c w not-a

L4

W

e?

L5

B

e

W

d

L6

B's Commitments

W's Commitments

a, b
c w not-a
e
d,
f

by AS1 that has e as
premise, and f as an
assumption and g as
potential exception

L7

B

Pose(g)

L8

W

Why not-g

L9

B

g

L10

W

e enot-c?

L11

B

No commitment e enot-c

L12

W

(f v b) e not-c ?

L13

B

(f v b) e not-c

d,
f

g

(f v b) e not-c
not-a

Key List
a: They never make a mistake doing the programme at OSSA.
b: All the experts go to OSSA.
c: Alf is staying home
d: Most Canadian philosophers go to OSSA
e: Alf said most Canadian philosophers go to OSSA
f: Alf is an expert
g:Alf is unbiased
At L13, Wilma wins – one can see how this is so with the following proof through Bob's
commitments to Wilma's thesis TW: (we assume that all the rules of propositional logic
are available to this dialogue; they are indicated in the proof by 'PL'):
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

(f v b) e not-c
b
f
fvb
not-c
c w not-a
not-a

(Established at L13)
(Established at L1)
(Established at L6)
(2, 3, PL)
(1, 4, PL)
(Established at L3)
(5, 6, PL) ■

The trick to Wilma's success is in using the assumption implicit in the argumentation
scheme at L6 to formulate the final implication at L12, having failed with the implicative
gambit (or “corner” in the language of (Walton 1984)) of L10. In more detail, the game
starts with Bob offering his position which commits him to two propositions (and, indeed,
several others omitted here for clarity). In order to try and have Bob retract his
commitment to a (that they never make a mistake in the conference programme), Wilma
adopts a strategy based on disjunctive syllogism, pointing out that (in the face of some
evidence), either Alf isn't going (c), or else a mistake has been made (not-a). At L3 Bob
accepts the disjunction, so Wilma proceeds to disprove the first disjunct. She starts by
introducing the claim that Alf wrote an article saying that most Canadian philosophers
attend OSSA (e). At L5, Bob agrees to this claim. At L6 Wilma uses an argumentation
scheme (we assume it is rather like the Scheme from Expert Opinion presented in the first
section) based on the premise e, and with the conclusion d, that most Canadian
philosophers do indeed attend OSSA. The use of this scheme involves an assumption –
that Alf is an expert (f), which gets tacitly added as another commitment under
commitment rule (iv). The scheme also has a potential exception – that the expert may be
biased – here referred to as g. (Note that the scheme carries a number of other
assumptions and exceptions omitted from this analysis for clarity). Bob decides to pose
the critical question associated with this exception – not because he has any particular
reason to doubt the honesty of the expert, but rather, as a strategic ploy, in an attempt to
shift the burden of proof to Wilma (Prakken et al., 2005). Unfortunately for Bob, at L8,
Wilma rejects the ploy by demanding justification for the critical question, as she is
permitted to do with critical questions associated with exceptions, under locution rule
(R5b). With no further evidence, Bob is compelled to concede that his question has no
further justification, so agrees that the exception does not hold (g). At L10, Wilma
attempts to win her “corner” - the premise that will guarantee success, namely the
conditional that if most Canadian philosophers are going, then Alf is going. Bob rejects
this conditional though. So at L12, Wilma adopts a different strategy, this time using the
implicit assumption from the argumentation scheme used earlier at L6. She again aims
for agreement on a conditional, this time that if Alf is an expert, and all experts are
attending OSSA, then Alf is attending OSSA. This time, Bob agrees, so Wilma wins her
corner – she has one of the disjuncts in her disjunctive syllogism shown to be false, so the
other – her ultimate thesis – must be true.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has aimed to sketch how traditional dialogue games can be extended to take
account of the dialectical nature of argumentation schemes. Most work on argumentation
schemes to date, both within argumentation theory, and also in artificial intelligence
where such schemes have found a very warm reception, has focused on the
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representational and inferential aspects. Yet schemes clearly have an inherently
dialectical nature, with critical questions forming a crucial component. By showing how
schemes can fit in to simple, well-established dialogue games, it becomes possible, first,
to develop more sophisticated games that exploit what argumentation schemes can do
with an eye to implementation in artificial intelligence, and second, to explore
theoretically the links between argumentation schemes and fallacies, for which dialogue
games were largely invented.
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REFERENCES
Gordon, T.F. & Walton, D. (2006). The Carneades argumentation framework. In P.E. Dunne & T.J.M.
Bench-Capon (Eds.), Computational Models of Argument (Proceedings of COMMA 2006) (pp.
195-207). Amsterdam: IOS Press.
Gordon, T.M., Prakken, T. & Walton, D. (2007). The Carneades model of argument and burden of proof.
Artificial Intelligence, to appear,
Grennan, W. (1997). Informal Logic. Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Hamblin, C.L. (1970). Fallacies. London: Methuen.
Hastings, A.C. (1963). A Reformulation of the Modes of Reasoning in Argumentation. Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation. Evanston, IL: University of Illinois.
Kienpointner, M. (1992). Alltagslogik : Struktur und Funktion von Argumentationsmustern. Stuttgart:
Fromman-Holzboog.
Mackenzie, J.D. (1979). Question begging in non-cumulative systems. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8,
117-133.
Perelman, C. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The New Rhetoric. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press.
John Pollock (1995). Cognitive Carpentry. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Prakken, H., Reed, C. & Walton, D. (2005). Dialogues about the burden of proof. In Proceedings of the
10th International Conference on AI & Law (ICAIL-05) (pp. 115-124). New York: ACM Press.
Rahwan, I. Zablith, F. & Reed, C. (2007). Laying the foundations for a world wide argument web. Artificial
Intelligence, to appear.
Reed, C. & Norman, T.J. (Eds.). (2003). Argumentation Machines: New Frontiers in Argument and
Computation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Reed, C. Walton, D. (2005). Towards a formal and implemented model of argumentation schemes in agent
communication. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 11, 173-188.
Verheij, B. (2003). Dialectical argumentation with argumentation schemes: An approach to legal logic.
Artificial Intelligence and Law, 11, 167-195.
Verheij, B. (2005). Virtual Arguments: On the Design of Argument Assistants for Lawyers and Other
Arguers. T.M.C. Asser Press.
Walton, D. (1984). Logical Dialogue Games and Fallacies. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Walton, D. (1996). Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
Walton, D. (1997). Appeal to Expert Opinion. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
Walton, D. & Krabbe, E.C.W. (1995). Commitment in Dialogue. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

11

